THEORIES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

• Ancient Hatreds
• Symbolic Politics/hypernationalism
• Scapegoats
• Security dilemma
• Greed
• Grievance or perhaps plain old nationalism
THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES

• Deterrence/responsibility to protect

• Moral Hazard

• Cornering target states
YUGOSLAVIA: THEORIES APPLIED

- Serbian rampage
- Milosevic the scapegoater
- Security dilemma
- Opportunistic rebels
- Competing nationalist projects
YUGOSLAVIA: BASIC INFORMATION

- Main groups: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Bosnian Muslims, Albanians, Hungarians

- Republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro

- Autonomies: Kosovo, Vojvodina

- The year of creation: 1946

- The underlying principle: three-tier ethnofederalism
CHRONOLOGY OF CONFLICT AND DISINTEGRATION

• 1980: Tito dies
• 1981: Riots in Kosovo
• 1987: The Speech in Kosovo Polje
• 1989: Downgrading of Kosovo and Vojvodina
• 1991: Slovenia secedes
• 1991: Croatia secedes and a war begins over Krajina.
• 1992: Bosnia-Herzegovina secedes and a war begins over the status of Bosnian Serbs
• 1995: The Second Serbo-Croatian war and the Dayton accords
• 1997: Insurgency in Kosovo
• 1999: Intervention in Kosovo
• 2006: Montenegro secedes
• 2008: Kosovo is recognized as independent
WHY WARS IN SOME PARTS OF YUGOSLAVIA AND NOT OTHERS

• Significant Serbian minorities or Serbian sovereignty in the case of Kosovo

• Third-party interventions on the other side.
INTervention in Kosovo

• Response to ethnic cleansing?
  – Doug Bandow: “An estimated 2000 people, including Serbs, were killed in Kosovo in 1998 and the first two months of 1999. At least three times as many people died in January 1999 alone in Sierra Leone. Nearly as many people died in one three-day battle between Tamil Tiger guerillas and the Sri Lankan government in the fall of 1998 as died in Kosovo during all of that year.”
  – Clark: “We thought the Serbs were preparing for a spring offensive that would target KLA strongholds, which had also been reinforced in previous months. But we never expected the Serbs would push ahead with the wholesale deportation of the ethnic Albanian population.”

• Moral Hazard?
  – Albright: “The galvanizing force of the [Racak]atrocity would not last.”
(EARLY) INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

• Zimmerman to Izetbegovic: Don’t sign it if you don’t like it.

• Zimmerman on what he thought Serbs would do in response to American recognition: “I believed that early Western recognition…might present Milosevic and Karadzic with a fait accompli difficult for them to overturn”
(EARLY) INTERVENTION IN CROATIA

• Zametica: “[Croatian president] Tudjman, facing strong pressure from the radical nationalist wing in his own party, staked everything on gaining international recognition. Croatia certainly needed this badly to retain its existing frontiers, for during July and August, almost a third of its territory fell to the Serbs, who had often been assisted by the federal army. In the light of this, a cessation of hostilities was not in the least desirable from the Croatian point of view. Since Germany had so helpfully talked of recognition unless the war in Croatia stopped, the bloodier the conflict, the greater the chances of obtaining recognition. The latter would not merely confirm Croatia’s statehood, but alas, so the government hoped, reimpose Croatian sovereignty over the Serbian enclaves.”
WHY WERE THERE NOT MORE WARS IN YUGOSLAVIA

• Slovenia

• Vojvodina

• Montenegro