What goes up must come down? Political decentralization and the emergence of regional autonomy movements
Dan Miodownik, University of Pennsylvania
Previous explanations of regional autonomy mobilization have produced inconsistent and contradictory findings on the effects of political decentralization and devolution of power on incentives to demands autonomy, and the popular appeal of these demands. One position, holds that the decentralization of political power will provide regional politicians with the institutional power to pressure the state for more concessions and may even contribute to the emergence of strong secessionist movements. Others argue that the empowerment of regional elites reinforce their loyalty to the state and diminishes the likelihood of autonomy mobilization. The lack of scholarly consensus hinders the efforts of policy-makers in shaping appropriate institutional responses to demands raised by supporters of autonomy and self-determination. For every policy recommendation, there are studies showing that it would either work well or work terribly. In this paper, I systematically evaluate theoretical propositions pertaining to the effects of political decentralization using an agent-based simulation methodology (ABM). Careful evaluation of the effects of regional and minority accommodation strategies under most economic and cultural circumstances, suggests that the risks of transferring power and responsibility to lower local or regional levels of government may be overstated. Entrusting regional elites with more responsibilities seems as the best way to reconcile/mitigate/regulate regional demands for autonomy.