Signaling Weakness or Building Capacity: A Reassessment of the Reputation Argument in Separatist Conflicts

ETH Zurich.

Previous research has found that ethnic self‐determination groups are more likely to rebel if they have observed government accommodation of an earlier violent challenger in the past. The assumption underlying these so‐called demonstration effects is that ethnic groups update their beliefs about how conciliatory the government is by observing how the government has behaved towards an earlier challenge. If an earlier challenger has been accommodated, other ethnic groups perceive the government as conciliatory or weak and an additional self‐determination challenge becomes less risky and therefore more likely. However, if the government has stood firm in the face of a separatist challenge and has not accommodated the challenger, it is perceived as strong and unrelenting and must not fear another challenge. This reputation argument has dominated the debate about domestic interaction processes with violent self‐determination movements and has been used widely in other research. It is also the continuation of a large body of research on the importance of reputation in international relations and in the Cold War era in particular.

URL: https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000000165

DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000000165

Schädel, Andreas. 2016. “Signaling Weakness or Building Capacity: A Reassessment of the Reputation Argument in Separatist Conflicts.” ETH Zurich.

@phdthesis{signaling-weakness-or-building-capacity,
   title = {Signaling Weakness or Building Capacity: A Reassessment of the Reputation Argument in Separatist Conflicts},
   author = {Schädel, Andreas},
   school = {ETH Zurich},
   type = {{PhD} dissertation},
   doi = {10.3929/ethz-b-000000165},
   url = {https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000000165},
   year = {2016},
   abstract = {Previous research has found that ethnic self-determination groups are more likely to rebel if they have observed government accommodation of an earlier violent challenger in the past. The assumption underlying these so-called demonstration effects is that ethnic groups update their beliefs about how conciliatory the government is by observing how the government has behaved towards an earlier challenge. If an earlier challenger has been accommodated, other ethnic groups perceive the government as conciliatory or weak and an additional self-determination challenge becomes less risky and therefore more likely. However, if the government has stood firm in the face of a separatist challenge and has not accommodated the challenger, it is perceived as strong and unrelenting and must not fear another challenge. This reputation argument has dominated the debate about domestic interaction processes with violent self-determination movements and has been used widely in other research. It is also the continuation of a large body of research on the importance of reputation in international relations and in the Cold War era in particular.}
}