Ethnofederalism: a slippery slope towards secessionist conflict?

ETH Zurich.
The scholarly debate on ethnofederalism as a suitable institutional tool to govern multiethnic societies is characterized by diametrically opposed positions. On the one hand, ethnofederalism is viewed as being able to accommodate ethnic groups and their needs for self‐determination through the devolution of power. On the other hand, ethnofederalism is believed to promote violent secessionism through exactly the same factors that are meant to appease ethnic groups. This dissertation tackles this debate by clarifying the concept of ethnofederalism and providing a new operationalization of the term. In particular, it takes into account ethnofederalism’s continuous nature, an observation that has been neglected in the literature. By geographically analyzing substate boundaries in federal countries, the thesis shows that regional risk for secessionist conflict increases if the match between substate boundaries and ethnic groups settlements increases up to a medium degree. The risk decreases again if the boundaries approach a state of perfect congruence.
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-a-00669029
Deiwiks, Christa. 2011. “Ethnofederalism: A Slippery Slope towards Secessionist Conflict?” ETH Zurich.
@phdthesis{ethnofederalism,
   title = {Ethnofederalism: a slippery slope towards secessionist conflict?},
   author = {Deiwiks, Christa},
   school = {ETH Zurich},
   type = {{PhD} dissertation},
   doi = {10.3929/ethz-a-00669029},
   url = {http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/view/eth:4691},
   year = {2011},
   abstract = {The scholarly debate on ethnofederalism as a suitable institutional tool to govern multiethnic societies is characterized by diametrically opposed positions. On the one hand, ethnofederalism is viewed as being able to accommodate ethnic groups and their needs for self-determination through the devolution of power. On the other hand, ethnofederalism is believed to promote violent secessionism through exactly the same factors that are meant to appease ethnic groups. This dissertation tackles this debate by clarifying the concept of ethnofederalism and providing a new operationalization of the term. In particular, it takes into account ethnofederalism's continuous nature, an observation that has been neglected in the literature. By geographically analyzing substate boundaries in federal countries, the thesis shows that regional risk for secessionist conflict increases if the match between substate boundaries and ethnic groups settlements increases up to a medium degree. The risk decreases again if the boundaries approach a state of perfect congruence.}
}