Nationality Questions and War: How Ethnic Configurations Affect Conflict Within and Between States
Journal of Conflict Resolution.
It is generally accepted that violations of state‐nation congruence can cause conflict, but it remains unclear which configurations cause civil and interstate conflict, and how these conflict types interact. Inspired by Myron Weiner’s classical model of the “Macedonian Syndrome,”we propose an integrated theoretical framework that links specific nationality questions to both conflict types. Using spatial data on state borders and ethnic settlements in Europe since 1816, we show that excluded and divided groups are more likely to rebel and, where they govern on only one side of the border, to initiate territorial claims and militarized disputes. To make things worse, rebellion and interstate conflict reinforce each other where ethnic division coincides with partial home rule. We obtain similar findings for civil wars and territorial claims in a global sample post‐1945. Yet governments shy away from engaging in interstate disputes to address nationality questions and instead support ethnic rebels abroad.
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Yannick Pengl, Dennis Atzenhofer, and Luc Girardin. 2025. “Nationality Questions and War: How Ethnic Configurations Affect Conflict Within and Between States.” Journal of Conflict Resolution.
@article{nationality-questions-and-war,
author = {Cederman, Lars-Erik and Pengl, Yannick and Atzenhofer, Dennis and Girardin, Luc},
title = {Nationality Questions and War: How Ethnic Configurations Affect Conflict Within and Between States},
journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
year = {2025},
abstract = { It is generally accepted that violations of state-nation congruence can cause conflict, but it remains unclear which configurations cause civil and interstate conflict, and how these conflict types interact. Inspired by Myron Weiner's classical model of the \textquotedblleft Macedonian Syndrome,\textquotedblright we propose an integrated theoretical framework that links specific nationality questions to both conflict types. Using spatial data on state borders and ethnic settlements in Europe since 1816, we show that excluded and divided groups are more likely to rebel and, where they govern on only one side of the border, to initiate territorial claims and militarized disputes. To make things worse, rebellion and interstate conflict reinforce each other where ethnic division coincides with partial home rule. We obtain similar findings for civil wars and territorial claims in a global sample post-1945. Yet governments shy away from engaging in interstate disputes to address nationality questions and instead support ethnic rebels abroad. }
}